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Terence G fson *

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE JUDICIARY
INTRODUCTION
My subject is systems of appeal and review in relation to public
administration, and in particular the uses and limitations of courts.
Let me begin with the background context. A matter that must surely
be of concern is the gulf, and possibly the widening gulf, between our
political ideology and the realities of the political process. Our
governments are self-proclaimed democracies, and yet the democratic
component within them is subject to such enormous pressures that the
key decisions in public policy seldom appear to be the output of any
democratic choice.
The world is threatened with annihilation by weapons of genocidal
magnitude; yet the perceived solution is more weapons of even greater
genocidal magnitude. Despite the manifest insanity of the Star Wars
program, we are being drawn inexorably into it, and no opinion among
the electorate would be likely to make any difference.
Similarly with regard to pollution, the majority of the population has
wanted tighter controls,l yet the Great Lakes have become the toxic
cesspools of North America just as the Baltic Sea has become the toxic
cesspool of Europe, and even the peaks of the Rocky Mountains are
now shrouded by air-borne pollution.
We have massive unemployment, largely the predictable result of
advancing technology, and yet all political parties seem dedicated to the
absurdity that the solution to unemployment is more jobs.
The theme that I want to develop is that the same irrational pressures
that have produced these results have also threatened and constrained the
democratic process in other ways, including the widespread expansion of
judicial review. 2 In Canada, this has now been enhanced by the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, 3 which expands judicial review in relation to
legislation and executive action.
These remarks are based primarily on Canadian experience, but
extracting from that experience points that I hope are of contemporary
interest in the communities of the south-west pacific region.
THE PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL REVIEW
The main concern is that judicial review rests upon a misconception of
the basic problems in public administration, and that it tends to
aggravate rather than mitigate those problems. With regard to the
regulatory agencies and tribunals, judicial review could make sense if
they consisted of enthusiastic people wielding power and who were

* Professor of Law, York University, Toronto.
I This is supported by various opinion polls. See eg Reduce Canadian-Made Acid Rain
- 86 Percent, The Gallup Report, 19 December 1983.
2 As well as court decisions over-riding the privative clauses, judicial review has received
an impetus from legislative changes. See eg Judicial Review Procedure Act, RSO 1980,
ch 224; Statutory Powers Procedure Act, RSO 1980, ch 484.
3 Canada Act, UK Statutes, 1982 ch I1, Part 1, Schedule B.
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carried away with excessive zeal, pursuing public policy objectives
regardless of the extent to which they trampled on private rights. That,
however, is not the way it is. A conscientious public servant who
faithfully strives to fulfil his mandate, perhaps by controlling pollution,
can expect to face challenges or obstruction from budget committees,
from legislative counsel, from officials of the Ministry of the AttorneyGeneral, from the Auditor-General, from the media, possibly from the
Ombudsman, from various vested interests, and perhaps from the courts.
A public servant in an environmental protection agency who is more
disposed to inertia and who engages in a program of minimal or useless
activity may face some criticisms, but not usually from powerful sources,
and he probably has a better prospect of a quiet life.
The main problem in public administration is not the excess or abuse
of power; it is inertia and under-achievement through the under-use of
power; the failure to engage in the conscientious pursuit of public policy
objectives. By focussing on the control of excess or abuse, and failing to
control under-achievement, we have promoted to new heights the old
common law view that misfeasance could be condemned in damages
while non-feasance was immune. Judicial review tends to enhance the
problem of under-achievement by adding another opportunity for
obstruction by those against whom public power ought to be exercised.
If we are to create a remedy for the basic problems in public
administration, it must be one that induces the proper exercise of power,
not one which, for the most part, simply adds another veto.
Of course problems of excess and abuse of power exist. They are
commonly found in the revenue departments and in those agencies that
are intended to serve ordinary people, such as those administering social
insurance and social security, and those that provide services to the
elderly and the disabled. Yet even here, judicial review tends to aggravate
rather than to correct the problems.
Unfortunately, the judicialization movement has also spilled over into
legislation. Judicial review has been so elevated to the status of a grand
panacea and supported by such powerful interests that elected
governments no longer feel that they have any choice but to allow
appeals or reviews of tribunal decisions by courts of general jurisdiction.
Examples can be seen in licensing systems, such as those relating to
real estate agents, used car dealers, mortgage brokers, itinerant salesmen
and collection agencies. A classic Canadian case 4 on licensing involved an
alleged abuse by a provincial Premier resulting in the non-renewal of a
liquor licence which the court concluded ought to have been renewed.
The widespread problem with licensing, however, is not the refusal,
revocation or non-renewal of licences. It is the failure to achieve the
objectives of the licensing statute by granting and renewing licences as a
standard routine without adequate systems of inspection or enquiry to
generate possible suspensions or revocations. This widespread problem is
commonly aggravated by legislative provisions for appeals against the
refusal, revocation, suspension or non-renewal of a licence, but no
appeal or comparable procedure when a licence is granted or renewed.'
The influence of the judicial process on the licensing administrator then
4 Roncarelli v Duplessis, [19591 SCR 121. This case went to the court as a tort claim
for damages.
5 See eg Consumer Reporting Act, SNS 1973, ch 4, as amended, s 7(3).
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operates only one way; protecting private interests, but not protecting the
public interests for which the licensing statute was passed in the first
place.
control, and I
Similar examples can be found in relation to pollution
6
believe that similar examples may exist in Australia.
Because it commonly operates only one way, and against the pursuit
of public policy objectives, judicialization can tend to induce timidity in
public administration and can enhance regulatory capture. As one of my
colleagues put it:
... the requirement of trial-type hearings and full-scale appeals
may well have, from the point of view of a regulated industry, the
desired effect of discouraging all but the most determined
administrator by forcing him to focus his scarce resources on a
relatively small number of cases so clear that they are likely to
survive even judicial scrutiny. The public's interest in attaining
regulatory objectives is, in the end, not likely to be served by
appeals to ordinary law. 7
The negative influence of the judicialization movement has not only
spilled over into legislation; it has also spilled over into the legislative
process, inducing a negative bias in the work of legislative drafters. For
example, the regulations proposed by the line departments of government
receive external scrutiny to ensure that they do not exceed the perceived
authority of the enabling statutes or other constitutional constraints;' but
there is no comparable provision for any external scrutiny to determine
whether the regulations proposed by the line departments are sufficient to
achieve the public policy objectives of the enabling legislation.
A key factor in the judicialization of public policy making is the
dominance of the legal profession, and particularly the bench, in the
control of value choices. The point was made by John Griffith in the
English context.
The higher judiciary comprises some one hundred persons, but the
truly effective number of policy-makers in the Divisional Court,
the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords is fewer than thirty.
These judges have, by their education and training and the pursuit
of their profession as barristers, acquired a strikingly homogeneous
collection of attitudes, beliefs and principles, which to them
represent the public interest.9
Even apart from socio-economic background, the career orientation of
the judiciary militates against the pursuit of public policy objectives.
They have generally been involved in individual cases for corporate or
individual clients rather than in policy planning. Except for those whose
careers have been in criminal law, few come from the public service.
This may help to explain why the values primarily espoused in the court

6 See eg Second Annual Report of the Administrative Review Council, 1978, Canberra,
para 48.
7 Without the Law, H W Arthurs, 1985, University of Toronto Press, p 200.
8 See eg Second Report of the Standing Joint Committee of the Senate and of the
House of Commons on Regulations and Other Statutory Instruments, 1977, Ottawa,
heading B, para 10.
9 The Politics of the Judiciary, J A G Griffith, 1977, Manchester University Press,
p 193.
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system appear to be private rights, and particularly private property
rights. As a leading scholar has put it in relation to pollution control:
The basic purpose of private civil actions and judicial review
actions is to vindicate private property rights that are infringed or
threatened by some other person,
corporation or public
authority. 10
Not only does the judicial process tend to prefer concentrated
corporate interests over more dissipated public interests, but it also tends
to prefer short-term over long-term interests. For example, a pollution
control official who takes aggressive action to protect an immediate
downstream or downwind interest from demonstrable harm can expect
more support from the legal system than one who takes the same action
to prevent the same pollution source from damaging human health by
adding to the continental or global aggregate of toxic contamination.
A related concern is the inequality of access to judicial review. "The
wealthy litigant whose affairs are not disadvantaged by the need to
resolve speedily the issue between him and his opponent has available the
luxury of multiple opportunities to attempt the resolution of a dispute". '
The delay, which is one factor causing the inequality of access, also
produces inequality in the significance of the outcome. In Ontario, for
example, it usually takes a year for an application for judicial review to
be heard. This may not concern a corporate litigant if the transaction is
small in relation to its total business; but it can be disastrous for a small
business person when the transaction in issue involves his total business,
or for a pensioner when the issue involves his primary income.
Where an appeal or review lies to a court of general jurisdiction from
a specialized tribunal, this can undermine the very purpose of
establishing the tribunal. A specialized tribunal may have been established
not only to depart from the adversary system but also to develop the
expertise in the subject matter required for the intelligent development of
policy. Once it is recognized that appellate adjudication is policy
making, 2 it makes no sense to develop that expertise in a specialized
tribunal and then have its decisions subject to appeal or review by a
generalist tribunal, particularly if it is also more constrained in its
procedures and resources.
In any event, intelligent policy making cannot be undertaken by a
tribunal whose interventions in a system are only episodic, and even
then, not of its own choice. Intelligent policy making, which is part of
system development, often requires co-ordination with budgeting and
executive action. Sometimes it also requires co-ordination with other
agencies of government. Above all, it often requires long-term planning.
It is this ongoing and co-ordinating responsibility, perception of
consequences and awareness of interactions that makes the ordinary
courts unsuitable as policy makers in public administration.
What is commonly involved in proceedings that are subject to judicial
10 "Legal

Foundations for Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking",
A R Lucas, (1976) 16 Natural Resources Journal 73, 93.
11 "Judicial Review of Tribunal Decisions - The Need for Restraint", D Pearce, (1981)
12 Federal Law Review 167.
12 This proposition is gaining recognition, even among the judges. See eg "The Charter
and the Judges: A View from the Bench", D G Blair, (1983) 13 Manitoba Law
Journal 445, 449.
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review is the interpretation of a statute and the development of a branch
of public administration through a body of case law. This can only be
done intelligently in the context of the universe that is affected by the
system. If it is labour law, for example, the case law development must
take place in the context of labour relations. The legal structure in other
subject areas is much less significant. The crucial point is that statutory
interpretation and case law development, if they are to be done
intelligently, involve policy making. Thus if most decisions are made by
a board, but some trickle through to courts of general jurisdiction, there
are then two and sometimes more than two alternative and potentially
rival sources of policy development.
Related to this, judicial review or appeal structures also tend to divert
legal work from the front line departments of governments to the central
crown offices, particularly the Ministries of the Attorneys-General.
Taking labour relations again as the example, tribunal cases may be
assigned to lawyers in the Ministry of Labour, but once a case goes to a
court of general jurisdiction on judicial review, it may then be perceived
as a matter of administrative law, and therefore to be conducted by a
lawyer in the Ministry of the Attorney-General. The result is likely to be
the reinforcement of private law concepts in public administration, and a
reduction of focus on public policy objectives.
The propensity in judicial review to classify policy choices as questions
of "law" can also tend to undermine consistency and co-ordination in the
processes of government. To operate and develop a system intelligently
usually requires consistency in the decision-making. To take an example
familiar to me, suppose a workers' compensation statute is drafted to
ensure that the taxi industry is included. Certain operators in the
industry attempt some manipulations to avoid the coverage, but the
board affirms that they are covered and consistently maintains that view.
Taxi companies pay assessments for many years. Claims from workers in
the industry are paid. Several pensions are being paid for permanent
disability and some widows pensions are being paid. Then a particular
taxi company retains a lawyer who thinks of a new way to argue against
the coverage. The board rejects the argument, but on judicial review, the
lawyer persuades the court to adopt his interpretation of the Act by
referring to dictionary definitions that may make no sense in terms of
the purposes of the legislation. The result could be chaotic, and it would
elevate an abstract concept to a virtue for anyone to claim that the result
was according to "law".' 3 Of course the damage might be repaired by
amendment of the Act, but only at substantial cost. Moreover, transitory
damage will have been done and the same thing could recur as the
courts deal episodically with other topics.
Related to this, a conflict often arises between judges and others
responsible for public administration with regard to categorical decisionmaking. Those responsible for the design of a legislative, regulatory and
administrative structure must decide to what extent the statutory
provisions should be applied to people or situations classified by predetermined criteria, and to what extent the decisions should vary
according to additional facts present in each case. In making these

13 Fortunately, the courts have shown some consciousness of this problem and have
shown considerable restraint with regard to workers' compensation. They have,
however, not shown the same restraint with regard to labour relations.
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choices, the system designer must consider problems of administrative
feasibility and aggregate cost as well as individual rights. This breadth of
vision may induce a perceived need for categorical decision-making that
is not appreciated subsequently by a judge of general jurisdiction,
particularly if he has detailed evidence relating to sympathetic
circumstances in the particular case. The result may be a temptation to
produce a decision which cannot and probably should not be applied in
other like cases, and hence which is incompatible with equality before the
law.
Another major problem with judicial review is the tendency to coerce
the adversary system on other adjudicating tribunals. For a variety of
reasons, a legislature may create a tribunal to adjudicate by an
inquisitorial rather than an adversarial process, or to adjudicate in some
other way. The government may want to avoid the cost of professional
advocacy; it may want to upgrade the quality of investigation by
combining that role with adjudication; it may wish to ensure that public
policy objectives are not sacrificed to private interests; it may wish to
upgrade the sensitivity of adjudication by including field-work in the
process; or it may wish to ensure that adjudication is part of an ongoing relationship. Whatever the reasons, judicial review can operate as a
pressure against the legislative choice in favour of an inquisitorial or
other system.
Again, a reason for establishing a tribunal in the first place is
commonly to permit the development of a structure and a procedure that
are suited to the particular subject matter and that differ from the
structures and procedures of courts and of other tribunals. Judicial
review has a homogenizing influence that ttnds to defeat that objective.
Judicial review does not require all tribunals to conduct their proceedings
on an adversary model, but they are safer if they do.
Regardless of the outcome of any proceedings, adherence to the
adversary model by a tribunal tends to receive approbation in the courts.
For example, where the same person is responsible for initiating and
investigating as well as for deciding, this tends to be perceived in the
courts as well as in the legal profession as a lower quality of
adjudication. Thus in one recent case, the judge of a court labelled
"superior" concluded that because an adjudicating tribunal did not always
follow the adversary system but sometimes initiated inquiries on its own,
its impartiality "may be open to some question". ' 4 A tribunal established
to proceed on an inquisitorial or other model may have to struggle
against the tide if the integrity of that system is to survive the onslaught
that it may receive from a legal profession dedicated to the adversarial
process.
Even when a tribunal is wrong and a court has identified the error on
judicial review, the dominating influence of the adversary system in
judicial review can still lead to a wrong solution. An example familiar to
me is a workers' compensation case in which the board, pursuant to its
usual policy, had refused to disclose to a claimant the medical reports on
file and which it was using in its adjudication. On judicial review, the
court decided that the reports should be shown to the claimant.'5 Of

14

Per Hinds J in Levy et a v Friedman (1985) Supreme Court of British Columbia,
unreported, Vancouver Registry No A 841608, p 17.
15 Re Napoli and Workers' Compensation Board, (1981) 126 DLR (3d) 179.
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course that decision was right as far as it goes; but it did not address
the basic problems with the board policy and for that reason did not
prescribe the appropriate solution. The decision only required medical
reports to be disclosed to a claimant when there is a conflict requiring
adjudication, and even then only at the appeal stage. There was no
discussion in the court decision of whether medical reports ought to be
disclosed to claimants at any time as a matter of basic human rights, or
to facilitate patient choices in medical care, or for other purposes
relating to their legal or political rights. When the court decision reached
the board it was, predictably, interpreted as requiring that in the event
of a medical issue arising on an appeal, the medical reports relating to a
disabled worker must be disclosed to the employer as well as to the
claimant. 1 6 Thus disclosure of personal medical information about a
worker to his employer came about as an automatic response to the
doctrinal and ideological demands of the adversary system without any
assessment of the harm that might be done through such disclosure, and
without any apparent value judgment on the measure of that harm
compared with the benefit of adherence to the adversary model.
The emphasis on the "hearing", which is a normal part of the
adversary system, is sometimes inappropriate for tribunals where
adjudication is part of a continuing process. For example, the payment
of benefits to a compensation claimant and the provision of
rehabilitation services may involve co-ordinated decisions made over
several months or sometimes years. Similarly, the resolution of a
pollution problem may involve integrated decisions made over a
significant period of time. The same can be said of the regulation of
telecommunications and of other industries where heavy investment
depends upon tribunal decisions. Justice, efficiency, and consistency as
well as the achievement of public policy objectives can all be threatened
if a tribunal, when adjudicating on a particular issue, is expected to
confine itself to the evidence adduced at a hearing for the decision only
of that case or issue.
In some subject areas, such as social insurance, the concepts inherent
in the adversary system may be inconsistent with the statutory structure
that was established. If a claimant appeals from an initial decision to a
tribunal, there is no general requirement for a "respondent", but the
courts impose that requirement on judicial review. There may be no-one
to fill that role except the social insurance agency itself, but to cast the
agency in that role can be inconsistent with the demeanour and attitude
that the agency was intended to adopt in the first place as an
adjudicating tribunal in relation to claimants.
Part of the blame for this dominance of the adversary system in legal
process must surely rest on the faculties of law. Traditionally, the
emphasis in the curriculum has been on private law subjects, and the
contemporary pressure is to enhance the traditional view. The adversary
system is commonly treated as a universal good, a model of decisionmaking for all subject areas and all adjudicating institutions. For the
most part, graduating law students and those called to the bar are
untrained in any other adjudicative model.
Central to much of this subject area is the lawyer's perception of

16 Decision No 338, (1981) 5 Workers' Compensation Reporter 109.
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virtue in the separation of powers; and yet many problems, including the
control of toxic waste, will not be solved without a blending of
investigation, regulation making, executive action and adjudication. It is
hopeless to regulate and then leave the imposition of sanctions to the
17
ordinary criminal courts.
Like other legal concepts, the separation of powers can be useful and
positive in result if used discriminately to achieve articulated goals and
with advertence to the consequences of its use. When broadened to a
principle of universal application, however, it is bound to be destructive.
Among other things, the resulting dispersal of responsibility can tend to
facilitate useless political decisions involving hypocrisy and resulting in
waste. In particular, it enables governments to pass regulatory legislation
with the appearance of doing something to resolve a problem while the
predictable result is no significant achievement.Is
The separation of powers is related to other propensities in government
to avoid a concentration of authority and to prefer decision-making
processes that involve co-ordination among different people, departments
and agencies. Yet as the chief executive of any major corporation could
tell us, that is not the way to achieve efficiency. The history of personal
injury compensation in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and the U.K.
illustrates the point. Great progress has been made when one key figure
on the government side with the imagination and the initiative has also
received the power and authority to design and implement a major
reform while the vested interests that have to be overcome have lacked a
strategic command. Conversely, significant reform in this subject area has
not been achieved when responsibility on the government side has been
shared among different people, departments and agencies.
The multiplicity of proceedings generated by judicial review, and by
structures created in response to the risk of judicial review, can require
co-ordination by people in different departments and agencies. This can
extend the number and range of people from whom an affirmative
decision is required for any effective action, and of course this dispersal
of veto powers among government officials can increase the lobbying
opportunities for vested interests. Moreover,
the multiplicity of
proceedings can multiply the total of decision-making costs.
In many systems of public administration, consistency and integrity can
be retained when the chairman of the final appeal tribunal also has
executive authority in relation to primary adjudication. This can help to
ensure that decisions made at the final level of appeal are followed in
primary adjudication. Conversely, where the final appeal lies to a court
of general jurisdiction, its decisions might be perceived by those
operating the system as aberrational. Hence to prevent system
deterioration or for other reasons, the agency may implement the
decision in the particular case while carrying on as before in every other
case.'9 When that happens, consistency and equality before the law have
17 See eg "The Uses and Limitations of Sanctions in Industrial Health and Safety",
T G Ison, Item No 158, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 203.

18 Perhaps the classic example is legislation in Canada and perhaps other commonwealth

countries relating to monopolies, mergers, and combinations in restraint of trade.
19 An example of this is Re Proc and Minister of Community and Social Services (1974)

53 DLR (3d) 512, dealing with the "man in the house rule" in welfare administration.
(For an Australian case that might be similar see Re Waterford and Director General
of Social Services, (1980) 3 Administrative Law Decisions 63.)

SOVEREIGNTY

OF

THE

JUDICIARY

been sacrificed, and the system of appeal or review by a court of general
jurisdiction is only a way of greasing a few squeaky wheels.
The negative influence of judicial review can also be seen in the
general legislation under which many tribunals must function. For
example, in Ontario the Statutory Powers Procedure Act20 provides that
a tribunal must, upon request, give reasons for its decision. The apparent
purpose is to facilitate judicial review. To require reasons for decision
only upon request ignores and detracts from the primary purpose of
giving reasons, i.e., to ensure that reasons are articulated in the mind of
the decision-maker before the decision is made, thereby enhancing the
prospect that decisions will be made for reasons that can withstand
reflection, at least in the mind of the decision-maker.
In other ways too, judicial review is detrimental to the public interest.
For example, it is common for a statute establishing a new area of law
to be cast in the style of skeleton legislation. The expectation is that the
administering and adjudicating tribunal will recognize the statute as a
skeleton structure, and that as the tribunal gains experience it will add
the flesh and blood to produce a workable system. 2' That is the
approach that an intelligent court will normally take when a statute
establishes the court as the adjudicating tribunal. Yet when courts are
reviewing the decisions of tribunals that they have labelled "inferior",
they take a more restrictive approach, reading the statute not as a
skeleton structure to be fleshed out by the tribunal, but as a perimeter
confining the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
Another major concern in relation to tribunals that have a pyramid
structure is that judicial review can tend to undermine rather than
enhance the quality of primary adjudication. For example in social
insurance and social security systems, there is often political pressure to
constrain the aggregate payout. This pressure can filter through the
system to emerge in irresponsible, curt and negative decisions reached
without adequate inquiry. Those who complain and persist, and their
legal or political representatives, can be placated by having a proper
inquiry conducted in the appeal system. In this way, the administering
agency can accommodate the political pressures both ways. Because
judicial review only comes into play, if at all, after the final level of
appeal within the system, it tends to entrench rather than dismantle that
practice, and hence tends to increase, rather than reduce, the overall
incidence of injustice.
Judicial review, and particularly the assault on privative clauses, has
probably had a negative influence on primary adjudication in another
way too. I think, for example, of the decisions of welfare administrators,
pensions adjudicators, and tax officials. The courts have labelled these
decisions as "administrative", and that characterization has generally been
accepted in the public service. Public expectations as well as expectations
within the public service would surely be different if the decisions made
at the primary level of adjudication were perceived as "judicial". That
term, however, is reserved for decisions made by those in more exhalted
positions. Thus judicial review has tended to discourage, rather than
encourage, the filtering down of a judicial posture to the level of
adjudication at which it could have the greatest utility.
20 RSO 1980 ch 484, s 17.
21 See eg Decision No 134, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 137, 138.
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Judicial review also encourages the perception of a tribunal, or the
upper echelon of a tribunal, as the lower level of a judicial hierarchy.
This can be a negative influence in the hiring of tribunal members, for
example it may be important to the efficacy of a statutory system that a
board chairman should have a mixture of executive, judicial and
legislative roles, which would probably include policy planning, coordination and implementation. The demands of that position may
require a person of an intellectual calibre higher than that normally
found among judicial appointments; but it surely makes no sense to have
appeals from a higher to a lesser intellect, particularly when the former
also has the expertise in relation to the subject matter. Thus judicial
review may well be a downward influence on the calibre of people
willing to accept appointments to a tribunal which the courts have been
allowed to label and treat as "inferior".
A final concern is the significance of judicial review in the distribution
of political power. When governments established a variety of
adjudicating tribunals they decided, among other things, that judicial
power should be more broadly distributed, that adjudicative decisionmaking should be more pluralistic. The goals, values and methods to be
brought to bear in these adjudicative processes were to be drawn from
broader sections of the community and not confined to those of a small
legal elite. Judicial review tends to defeat that democratizing move by
establishing a pyramid structure with judges in courts of general
jurisdiction at the apex.
EXPLANATIONS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW
The expansion of judicial review cannot be explained or justified by
the reasons given in the advocacy in support of it. At least since Lord
Hewart wrote The New Despotism,22 much of that advocacy has
consisted of emotional rhetoric, claiming that, for example, ". . . the
power of judicial review constitutes the last bulwark of the citizen
against the arbitrary decisions of the state". 2 3 Such rhetoric might pass
muster on ceremonial occasions or in after-dinner speeches, but it cannot
withstand serious reflection in the light of day.
The main problem with such claims is that they misrepresent the
distribution of power in society. Such claims have created a conventional
wisdom in relation to judicial review that bureaucrats wield power, and
that they seek to expand that power. The reality is that power rests
predominantly outside the public service, and predominantly in the
corporate sector. Judicial review does little to restrain the abuse of that
power. Indeed, it ranks among the negative influences that restrain
government departments and tribunals from controlling the exercise of
corporate power.
In any political society, one would expect that if allegations of
excessive power are being made by people in establishment institutions,
those allegations would be levied not against those who wield the power
that controls that society, but against those whose accrual of some
degree of power is perceived as threatening. It may be partly for this
reason that many judges have seen the civil service and tribunals as a

22
23

1929, Cosmopolitan Book Corp., New York.
The Sword and Scales, J Deschenes, 1979, Butterworths, Toronto, p 29.
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threat to be controlled. Thus judicial cries for the judicial protection of
the citizen against the state may be no more than special pleading for
the power and privilege of judicial law-making and its supremacy over
the democratic process. The decisions of legislatures to confer upon
tribunals a range of remedies and sanctions that were not bestowed upon
the courts may have been another factor contributing to jurisdictional
jealousy.
Much of the enthusiasm for judicial review has rested upon a respect
for the "rule of law", and yet that concept has surely been undermined
more than it has been enhanced by judicial review. It has been
undermined primarily by being narrowed. "Law" has been defined as
"ordinary law", which has been defined as the law created or applied by
courts of general jurisdiction. 24 Thus instead of being perceived as
applying to all tribunals and departments of government, the "rule of
law" was defined in a way that would justify a judicial power grab. The
resulting judicial message to tribunals and departmental decision-makers
is that the "rule of law" is not relevant to their own law-making
responsibilities. It is hardly surprising that, despite decades of judicial
review, many public officials, including tribunal members, perceive of the
statutes which have created their tribunals or departments and which
have conferred their powers as a form of decorative literature rather than
as a body of law to be implemented.
The assertion that only courts can determine "law" is a notion born of
wizardry and power politics, not of any rational analysis of public need,
or of any choice made in the democratic process. It reflects an attempted
ideological rationalization for judicial review that is oriented in private
law, not in public law. It perceives of a legal system that is an
authoritarian pyramid structure with the appellate courts as the apex. A
more democratic perception of the nature of law might well see
legislatures as the apex with courts and other adjudicating tribunals
functioning in parallel with each other, exercising the authority that the
legislature has delegated to them, and acting in relationships of
superiority to each other only when the legislature has so determined.
An alternative assertion is that judicial review is needed to prevent
tribunals from abusing their powers or otherwise behaving in
irresponsible ways. One difficulty with that assertion is that the remedy
is unrelated to the scope of the problem. The neglect of power and the
failure to act are seldom controlled by judicial review, and where the
abuse of power exists, it may be systematic. Hence it may require a
system-oriented response and one that does not depend upon private
action for its initiation. Moreover, the history of administrative law has
probably seen more abuse of power by the judiciary than by the
tribunals. Indeed, the ultimate affront to the democratic process is surely
the judicial decisions that have over-ridden or ignored the privative
clauses. With judicial review, the risk of arbitrary or irresponsible
conduct on the part of those who are more or less answerable to
parliament is replaced by the risk of arbitrary or irresponsible conduct
on the part of those who are virtually immune from any form of
democratic scrutiny.
The expansion of judicial review can only be explained by looking
beyond the ostensible reasons. One factor has been the power and
24

For example, this theme runs through The New Despotism, fn 22.
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influence of the legal profession, promoting a reverence for courts as
decision-making institutions. One of my colleagues has described this
influence as ". . . largely stimulated by self-interest and rooted in an
ideology of self-importance". 25 While that unkind phrase may be harsh,
there is no doubt that the legal profession has tended to elevate courts
of general jurisdiction and to disparage other tribunals, though the
profession has been more divided and more accepting of a tribunal if it
is one in relation to which a specialist bar has developed.
Another factor supporting judicial review has been that the source
material for the literature on the subject creates an over-estimate of its
achievements. Part of the blame lies with the case method of legal
education and with the production of textbooks by using the law reports
as primary source material. The cases most commonly used in legal
education and legal literature are not representative. They include a
disproportionate number in which the decision of a tribunal, minister or
department was disturbed by the court on review. Nor are they written
by an impartial observer. For example, one would expect the interaction
between a court and a tribunal to be described differently if the reported
account had been written by a tribunal member. Perhaps most
important, the law reports tell us little or nothing about the real impact
of judicial review. Commonly they do not include even the end result in
the particular case.
In some subject areas, the decisions on judicial review have, been
counter-productive partly because the value orientation of the judiciary
has been different from that of the tribunal and partly because the
intellectual quality of the court decisions has been inferior to those of
the tribunal. An example is the decisions relating to the Labour Relation
Board in Ontario, and in some other provinces.
There are other subject areas in which the intellectual quality of the
court decisions has commonly exceeded that of the tribunal decisions, but
even in those subject areas, the overall impact of judicial review is still
probably negative. For example, in cases where the decision of a
workers' compensation board has been disturbed by a court on appeal or
review, it is my impression that for the most part, the board was
obviously wrong and the court obviously right. Part of the explanation is
that in workers' compensation, as in other systems of social insurance
and social security, the incidence of political power in the legislative
process differs from what it is in subsequent administration and
adjudication. The result is that the administering and adjudicating
department or tribunal is under constant pressure not to fulfil the terms
of the Act. Judicial review can serve a purpose here, and indeed, a few
examples can be found to support the assertion that judicial review
operates to protect the citizen against bureaucracy. Despite this
assessment, I would see judicial review as counter-productive even in this
subject area, and for these reasons.
1. The disturbance of a board decision by a court does not
always indicate the result in the case. Often the court decides
simply that the board reached its conclusion by the wrong
criteria. It may then be open to the board to reach the same
conclusion by other criteria; and if it does, the results may
well have included a substantial waste of public and private
25 See fn 7, p 164.
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funds, additional frustration for the claimant, and a delay in
rehabilitation
(sometimes
with
permanent
damage
to
rehabilitation prospects).
For every case in which a court has disturbed a board
decision, there were probably twenty other applications for
judicial review in which it declined to do so. Those court
decisions will have taken months or years, sometimes with
damaging delays in the commencement of rehabilitation.
Moreover, the protraction of a litigious atmosphere and the
consequential increases in the number of professionals
interacting with the claimant can be causes of therapeutic
harm. 26 Also substantial amounts of private and public funds
will have been spent on an unproductive process.
For each case in which a court has disturbed a board decision,
there were probably a hundred or more other board decisions
that were just as wrong, but which were not corrected because
of the variety of factors that can deter or divert a claimant
from seeking judicial review. If there is to be a system of
outside intervention to prevent injustice by a workers'
compensation board, it should not be a process that involves
damaging delays, and which even at its best only provides
unequal justice by greasing a few squeaky wheels. Any outside
intervention should be by way of systematic supervision that
includes spot checking on the primary level of adjudication to
ensure consistency and to ensure that the response to
systematic injustice is a systematic remedy.

Similar concerns arise in relation to social security. The decision of a
particular case on judicial review may result in a welfare recipient
receiving the benefits to which she was entitled, but what is the aggregate
effect?
The appeal to ordinary law does not add a penny to the total
welfare budget, but it may divert some part of that limited budget
27
from the benefits account to administration and litigation.
THE REALITIES OF POWER
Underlying the widespread expansion of judicial review has been a
mythology that misrepresents the incidence and use of political power.
The target has been the public servant, "the departmental despot" whose
unbridled power requires that his encroachments upon our human rights
and civil liberties must be constrained by judicial review.
The reality, of course, is that few public servants ever rise above the
mid-range in the power structure. The power of some public servants is
significant in relation to the under-privileged but is still slight in relation
to those who really wield power.
To a large extent, power lies in the hands of those who control a few
multi-national conglomerate oligopolies. This corporate power in relation
to the political process and public administration is assured by the scale

26 See eg "The Therapeutic Significance of Compensation
forthcoming in the University of Toronto Law Journal.
27 See fn 7, p 200.
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of modern production, finance, and marketing, creating as it does an
inevitable coincidence between economic and political power. This
corporate power is nurtured and exercised through the financial and
other support of political parties, professional peer group affiliations and
job interchanges, the control of much economic information in the
corporate sector, the continuous monitoring of government action,
ownership and advertising, the
control of the media through
establishment of satellite "research" institutions, the control of boards of
governors of public institutions (including universities), and other social,
recreational and residential connections that contribute to the dynamics
of elite accommodation. 2 8
A significant incident of the power is the threat to withdraw, or not to
provide, something that only the corporate world is portrayed as able to
furnish. For example, proposals for government action are supported or
resisted by reference to the need to attract foreign capital, or to retain
domestic capital.
...
business and its representatives are part of a high level,
interactive business-government-civil service network that is not
duplicated in the same way for any other interest group in
society. 29
Even at the high points of public disapproval of corporate conduct,
the political clout of business has always kept really threatening
intervention outside the realm of practical politics. 30
Perhaps what is most crucial is not so much the power to control the
outcome of decisions as the power to determine the agenda; the power to
determine what issues are debatable. "Definition of the alternatives is the
choice of conflicts, and the choice of conflicts allocates power." 3t For
this reason, the incidence of political power cannot be measured by
counting the winners and losers in the outcomes of public controversies.
Influence on governmental decisions is only a part, and perhaps the
lesser part, of corporate power. Even more important is the power of
independent action.
... the largest corporations . . . are political systems that exercise
power within spheres that extend far beyond their ostensible
functions of efficient producers of goods and providers of services.
Notwithstanding the rise of manifold regulation and the alleged
play of pluralist, countervailing forces, the large corporation wields
commands, directs and
power of a governmental kind that
32
influences large segments of society.
and
.. . those citizens attempting, individually or collectively, to
protect themselves from the impacts of corporate policy on their
life and health are consistently forced to play against a stacked
deck. 3

28 See eg Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, R Presthus, 1973, Cambridge UP.
29 Corporate Power and Public Policy, S M Beck, Lecture delivered at Osgoode Hall
Law School, York University, Toronto, April 1985, p 35.
30 Corporate Control, Corporate Power, E S Herman, 1981, Cambridge UP, p 296.
31 The Sremi-Sovereign People, E E Schattschneider, 1960, Holt, Rinehart, p 68.
32 Fn 29, p 3.
33 Political Economy of Environmental Hazards, T F Schrecker, 1984, Law Reform
Commission of Canada, p 78.
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The power is exercised too by the infiltration of other organizations.
Even in faculties of law, for example, we have seen the offer to law
faculty members of free indoctrination programs in attractive resort areas
aimed at resurrecting 19th century market theory under the guise of "law
and economics". When commercial activity is clearly operating against
the public interest, this is labelled as "market failure", as if it were some
exceptional and unexpected deviation from the blissful state that should
result naturally from unrestricted corporate activity.
The multi-national conglomerates, with satellites of professional firms
in support roles, constitute gigantic organizations. Organization is (among
other things) the mobilization of bias, 3 4 and massive organization is the
mobilization of bias on massive scale.
Of course corporate interests coincide to a large extent with public
interests. Even where they conflict, examples can be found of a
corporation compromising its own interests to accommodate public policy
objectives. Also of course multi-national conglomerates often play the
role of "good corporate citizens" in other ways, particularly by charitable
contributions and by patronage of the arts. The hard reality remains,
however, that there is to a large extent a structural, natural and
inevitable conflict between corporate goals and the public interest. This
conflict emerges in relation to such matters as pollution, occupational
health, subsidies from tax-payers money to corporations, and other ways
of externalizing cost. Perhaps above all, the conflict relates to the
definition of the gross national product.
It is surely this power structure that explains why the Great Lakes
have become the toxic cesspools of North America, why deregulation and
reduced enforcement are perceived as progress in relation to occupational
health, why the solution to unemployment is perceived as more jobs, and
why the solution to the arms race is perceived to lie in more genocidal
weapons. It is surely this power structure that explains too why species
of animals that have inhabited the earth for millions of years are being
extinguished by corporate activity, why buildings that have stood as
monuments for centuries are being destroyed by acid rain, and why in
Europe even the Black Forest is disappearing. It is surely this power
structure that also explains why primitive peoples who have lived in
harmony with nature for generations are now being trained to pollute
and destroy. It is this power structure that helps to explain too the
expansion of judicial review.
Of course any political society must seek to balance and resolve
conflicting private and public interests, but it is surely inherent in
democracy that this resolution should be achieved through the electoral
process. A major problem with judicial review is that after the balance
has been struck by the legislature, it may then be shifted, by those who
are not answerable to the electorate, in favour of corporate interests.
Many examples have been seen in the area of labour law. Our labour
relations legislation proclaims as a matter of public policy the promotion
of collective bargaining among employees, 35 and that policy is generally
pursued by labour relations boards. Yet when issues such as picketing at
shopping centres or secondary picketing are considered by courts of
general jurisdiction on judicial review or in other ways, there is a
34 Fn 31, p 71.
35 For example, Labour Relations Act, RSO 1980, cb 228, preamble.
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propensity to prefer private interests over the public policy proclaimed by
the legislature, and the courts have been willing to override or ignore
privative clauses to protect those interests. Thus the charisma of judicial
review that stems from the elevation of courts and the disparagement of
administrative tribunals becomes another device for preferring corporate
interests over the democratically proclaimed public policy.
The realities of political power do not have, and perhaps never did
have, much in common with the perceptions of power that inspired the
expansion of judicial review. The burgeoning of tribunals was seen as
threatening. It threatened the corporate sector with restraints upon the
corporate role in economic and political planning as well as with other
interventions that might allow the democratic process to curtail their
activities. It threatened the bench by the establishment of rival
jurisdictions; and it threatened the legal profession by creating tribunals
in which expertise in the adversary process might not place the profession
at an advantage.
Judicial review has done little or nothing to protect the citizen against
those who wield power. For example, after several decades of judicial
review, one of our leading scholars in the area of environmental law has
written that
... there are few clearly established rights to participate in
environmental decisions available to Canadian citizens. To the
for participation,
extent that citizens are permitted opportunities
36
these are now formal, and largely ineffective.
Corporate power is relevant to judicial review in several ways. First, as
mentioned above, judicial review and other uses of courts have a
constraining influence on regulatory processes. Secondly, judicial review
tends to shift the balance that has been struck by the legislature between
corporate and public interests by moving it in favour of the former.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the ongoing exercise of corporate
power requires the submission of governments to the dominance of
corporate interests, and the acquiescence of other elites in that
submission is more readily secured if governments also accommodate the
interests of the professions, including the interests of the bench and bar
in judicial review.
These political realities may help to explain why the expansion of
judicial review has not taken place in response to any situation by
situation or item by item evaluation of its significance and consequences,
but rather by broad assertions of its inevitable value. These political
realities also help to explain, to a large extent, the impotence of judicial
review as a protection of the public interest and even as a remedy for
the aggrieved citizen against the state. If we consider, for example,
systems of social insurance and social security, the power structure
operates on the aggregate, not selectively against individual claims. Of
course judicial review might occasionally tip the balance in favour of a
claimant in a particular case, and for that individual, might be
beneficial; but its overall impact on the system will have been to provide
the occasional palliative rather than a systematic remedy large enough to
strike the full scope of the injustice.

36

Fn 10, p 74.
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THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS
The ultimate step was taken when Pierre Trudeau, playing the role of
The Sorcerer's Apprentice, introduced a new constitution for Canada,
including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 37 In 1982, this
was enacted by the Parliament at Westminster in its last gasp as the
Imperial Parliament in relation to Canada. The Charter expanded judicial
review in relation to legislation, as well as executive action.
Until this point, the validity of legislation could rarely be challenged
except by reference to the distribution of powers between the national
and provincial governments. Now the affliction of federalism is
compounded by a constitutional charter that enables legislation to be
challenged on a broad range of grounds, such as freedom of religion or
expression, mobility rights, rights to life, liberty and security of the
person, rights to retain counsel, equality rights, language rights, etc.
The substantive "rights" which were "guaranteed" by the Charter were
so manifestly laudable that any questioning of the real significance of the
document may have seemed, and may still seem, both irreverent and
irrelevant.
The ostensible entrenchment of these civil liberties was part of a
package that included the introduction of a constitutional amending
formula and the further entrenchment of language rights. The package
involved a complicated political manoeuvre which had as one of its
objectives the diminution of Quebec separatism and the political
consolidation of Quebec in Canada.
The result is a calamity. Almost all of the objections to judicial review
mentioned above apply to the Charter, but their significance is greater in
this context, and more objections must be added.
The Charter entrenches the right to vote, and yet nothing this century
has subverted that right more than the Charter itself. The sovereignty of
Parliament, once perceived as the essence of democracy, 38 is now
replaced by the sovereignty of the judiciary, and the right to vote is now
a right to vote only for the membership of subordinate institutions. The
policy making tribunal which now stands at the apex of governmental
power is neither elected nor representative. Its membership consists of
appointed officials, predominantly male, predominantly drawn from the
same generation, and all drawn from the same profession.
Unfortunately, the right to vote has been undermined not only by the
Charter but by other developments. First, its significance has been eroded
by technological "progress" of enormous magnitude. The development
choices confronting society have become so obscure in their far-reaching
and permeating consequences that they are no longer visible as choices
confronting the electorate at all. Thus technological changes, such as jet
travel, nuclear power and the advances in micro-computer mechanisms,
have not resulted from any choice of the electorate, nor usually from
any known choice of elected officials. Yet they shape the environment

37 Fn 3.
38 The Chief Justice of Canada is reported
Parliamentary sovereignty never applied
outside the UK. "Justice Dickson Casts
(1985) 5 Ontario Lawyers Weekly No 13,
concern.

as having contended that the doctrine of
in any event to commonwealth countries
New Light on Parliamentary Supremacy",
p 1. That contention, however, adds to the
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and the nature of the society in which we live. Meanwhile, the role that
political parties might have played in the formation of policy has been
replaced by campaign imagery, brokerage politics and the dynamics of
elite accommodation.
Secondly, the democratic dimension of government has been threatened
by the recent adoption of value for money audits and the associated
demand for program evaluation.3 9 With regard to many government
programs, it is close to impossible to develop the research techniques for
ascertaining their consequences, let alone attaching any value to them.
The demand for periodic program evaluation coupled with the lack of
any scientific method of measurement is likely to mean that, in practice:
(a)

With some exceptions, particularly in relation to the
military, a structural bias is established against any policy
the success of which cannot be demonstrated in dollar
amounts or other numerical units;

(b)

Interest groups with ongoing political influence in relation
to administration will tend to have even greater power
compared with more dissipated groups that only represent
the public interest and that can only muster the resources
for more episodic political action;

(c)

Yet another vehicle is established through which the value
judgments and political influence of a small elite, closely
associated with corporate interests, can masquerade as
professional output.

These are the developments that, together with the Charter, really
threaten the right to vote, but no protection from them will be found in
the Charter. Constitutional entrenchment of the right to vote may have
its aesthetic attractions, but it is a cruel illusion.
There are two provisions of the Charter which might be seen as
attempts to mitigate its anti-democratic nature. The first is a provision
that the "rights" which are "guaranteed" by the Charter are not absolute;
they are subject ". . . to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". 40 One might
have thought that in a free and democratic society, the proper limits on
corporate and personal rights should be those prescribed by the elected
legislature without being subject to over-ruling by an appointed judge.
The second provision is that, with regard to most sections of the
Charter, there can be a legislative over-ride. 4 1 Where the legislature
expressly declares that a statute shall operate notwithstanding a provision
included in the specified sections of the Charter, the statute is not
limited by the Charter provisions. As a matter of practical politics,
however, it is doubtful whether this legislative over-ride can be used
outside of Quebec. It is particularly unlikely that it could be used in any
bill that was opposed by a powerful interest having media support.

39 See eg "Assessing the Results of Public Expenditure: Program Evaluation in the
Canadian Federal Government", J M Jordan et al, (1979) 22 Canadian Public
Admtinistraijon 581; "Evaluation in Practice: the State of the Art in Canadian
Governments", H G Rogers et al, (1981) 24 Canadian Public Administration 371.
40 Fn 3, s I.
41 Fn 3, s 1.
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Moreover, the legislative over-ride is subject to expiry42 in five years,
though with the possibility of renewal every five years.
The Charter also undermines the franchise by allowing politicians to
dump hot issues, such as abortion, pornography and Sunday closing, into
the courts. The likely result is to make the political process even more
bland, and to make elected representatives even less responsible.
Another aspect of the right to vote which we have claimed
distinguishes "the free world" from eastern block countries is the right of
the electorate to switch from one political ideology to another. While
that choice may already have gone as a matter of practical politics, it
may now be gone as a matter of constitutional law. To a substantial but
unmeasurable extent, the Charter entrenches a political posture. Consider
what would happen if a government was elected that wanted to
nationalize a major industry, say the banking system. The Charter, on its
face, avoids the entrenchment of property rights, and that was a
deliberate decision resulting from the compromises made in the
parliamentary process. Yet it would take an incredible naivety to feel
confident that the courts 43
would not decide that such a nationalization
statute is unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the media coverage prior to the event did not include
much analysis of the real significance of the Charter. It focussed on
political controversy about particular rules rather than the significance of
the aggregate. For example, women's organizations campaigned for the
constitutional entrenchment of sex equality and native organizations
campaigned for the constitutional entrenchment of native rights. Except
in Quebec (and perhaps Saskatchewan), no organization appeared to be
campaigning for the constitutional entrenchment of nothing. The debate
was usually presented in the media as if somehow the Charter would be
a self-executing document. With some exceptions at low profile, there
was little recognition in the media of the transfer of legislative power to
the judiciary. Yet the terms of the Charter are so broad and general that
now as a practical matter the validity of legislation and of executive
action becomes a matter of judicial discretion.
Related to this is the increased technicalization of the debate of public
policy issues, with consequential impairment of public participation. The
technicalization of public policy decision-making is long standing. Indeed,
it can be seen as a natural outcome of the Industrial Revolution, the
emergence of the professions, and the Companies Acts. For example, in
occupational and public health, the processes of risk assessment are
rarely separated from the decisions on acceptable risk, and both are
commonly perceived as technical.
Even with regard to major
developments, such as nuclear power, the risks associated with each
alternative strategy were never identified and assessed in any publication
that would have enabled a public preference to be expressed about which
set of risks the public would rather take. Political questions involving
serious value judgments are commonly decided by those with the
technical knowledge as if they were purely technical questions. Even

42 Ibid.

43 It is not impossible to find statements among some of the judiciary that saving us
from socialism is one of the functions of judicial review. See fn 23. See also "The
Legalisation of Politics in Advanced Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms", H J Glasbeek et al, (1984) 2 Socialis! Studies 84.
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when government officials are involved in the decision-making, the
mechanization, electrification, automation and chemicalization of modern
industry and commerce create complex structures in which the decisions
of people in managerial, technical and professional positions translate
into an output form that assumes the appearance of inevitable destiny.
Here again, the Charter does more to aggravate than to mitigate the
problems. Decisions under the Charter are perceived as "legal". They are
not for the instinct of jurors but are made by judges assisted by "legal"
advocacy. Not only does this tend to trivialize and technicalize the debate
of public policy issues, but almost inevitably, the values espoused in the
process will tend to be those of the clientele from which the legal
profession derives most of its income.
This last point can be illustrated by reference to the burden of proof
in the control of toxic contamination. What position should a
government take with regard to the release of potentially toxic substances
into the air, into our water, or into our food? If the toxicity of a
substance has never been tested by any means that would yield reliable
conclusions in relation to human beings, should the substance be
assumed safe and its use allowed until harm is demonstrable, or should
it be assumed to be harmful and its use prohibited until its safety can be
demonstrated? This question, which may involve how much risk should
be taken in the pursuit of maximum consumption, is surely one for the
elected branch of government, or at least for officials who are
answerable to the elected branch of government. Where, however, an
administering agency decides in favour of caution, it may run the risk of
judicial reversal by a court which, in the exercise of its legislative power,
wants proof of harm as a justification for any government restraint on
44
corporate enterprise.
Another way in which the Charter tends to enhance corporate power
is, of course, the inequality of access to legal services. Even before the
Charter, the President of the Canadian Federation of Independent
Business said this:
I began to see how the system is stacked in favour of those who
own all the lawyers. I found out that the big corporations,
without being conspiratorial, control the knowledge factory in this
45
country . . . Its a mandarin to mandarin process.
Here again, the Charter does more to aggravate than to mitigate the
problem. Unrealistic suggestions are sometimes heard that equality of
access might be achieved by the expansion of legal aid, but there is no
prospect of that happening on any scale that would produce equality of
access. Moreover, any moves towards it can add further to the enormous
waste of public money resulting from the Charter. Inevitably, the
multiplicity of forums for the debate of controversial political issues
tends to increase the cost of participation in that debate, and thus
enhances further the political power of those with the greater resources.

44 In the United

States,

this attitude has

emerged

in cases

on judicial

review of

regulation-making. In Canada, it has emerged in the decisions on prosecutions. See eg
R v Windsor Board of Health et a/, (1982) Canadian Employment Safety and Health
Guide 95.046.
45 Quoted in The Political Economy of Interest Groups in the Legislative Process in
Canada, F Thompson et al, 1979, Occasional Paper No 9 for the Institute for
Research on Public Policy, Montreal, p 48.
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Like the older type of judicial review under the prerogative writs, the
Charter is counter-productive because it misrepresents the real incidence
of political power. It seeks to protect civil liberties, but it rests on a
false assumption about where the threats are coming from. On its face,
the Charter would seem to constrain everyone. It provides that it applies
to the Parliament and Government of Canada and to the legislatures and
governments of the provinces. On ordinary principles of interpretation,
that would be read in the same way as the traditional clause in a statute
that "This Act binds the Crown". The interpretation that appears to be
prevailing, however, is that the Charter only binds the legislatures and
governments. On this view, the decisions of multi-national corporations
are free from challenge. A judicial veto has been created over decisions
reached through the democratic process, and over the decisions of those
who exercise lesser degrees of power, but no comparable control has
been created over those who function outside the democratic process and
who exercise greater degrees of governmental power. The Charter
protects corporations against the elected representatives of the people but
does nothing to protect the people against the unilateral actions of
corporations. In this way, too, it introduces another judicial structure for
the further enhancement of corporate power.
Fundamental rights essential to the democratic process, such as
freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association
have now been formally enshrined in the Charter,4 6 but at the same time
they have been undermined by technological changes and economic
concentration that have subjected the media of communication to the
control of a tight oligopoly.
Almost as a sick joke, the Charter provides for "freedom of the press
and other media of communication", 47 but the control and the censorship
are not coming primarily from elected governments. The Charter does
nothing to require the divestiture of ownership of the media by multinational conglomerates, nor does it even require a separation of the tie-in
between advertising and news reporting. Moreover, if any government
tried to provide for a genuinely free press, the legislation would be
challenged as a violation of the Charter, and it would probably be
declared invalid.
Similarly, sex and age equality are more seriously threatened by the
nature and the massive scale of technological change than by the
decisions of elected representatives. The Charter does more to prevent
than to promote the subjection of such changes to democratic scrutiny.
At the more trivial level, the Charter protects our homes from the
intrusion of meat inspectors 48 (who were never famous for their home
visits anyway) while it does nothing to protect us from the daily invasion
of hand bills and telephone advertising.
In other ways too, the Charter operates to impair the democratic
process and to enhance corporate power. There has been concern in
Canada, as in other countries, about the enormous funds spent on
election campaigns. A party, candidate, or supporters could swamp the

46 Fn 3, s 2.
47 Ibid.
48 S 20 of Bill C-27 (1985), which is an omnibus bill to bring federal statutes into accord
with the Charter, amends the Meat Inspection Act to prohibit an inspector from
entering a dwelling house without a warrant.
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media, gaining a substantial advantage over others with fewer resources.
To provide for more equality of opportunity in seeking public office,
Parliament passed a common type of statute to limit the amount that
could be spent on election campaigns. That was challenged under the
is
Charter and the court decided that a crucial provision of the statute
49
now unconstitutional as an encroachment upon freedom of speech.
It has been suggested, almost as a justification for the Charter, that
the judges have exercised their new powers with restraint. Examples can
be found either to support or to contradict that view. Even if one
accepted the assertion at face value, the creation of a power to
undermine the democratic process can hardly be justified because those
exercising the power have used restraint. The same could be said about
other branches of government, including the legislatures, tribunals and
the executive that the judiciary is ostensibly protecting us against. If we
are to place our faith in restraint in the exercise of paramount power,
my preference would be not to place that faith in the one branch of
government that is virtually immune from any kind of democratic recall.
Administrative lawlessness, which was so much the concern of Lord
Hewart, is subject to at least some controls by parliamentary scrutiny,
the Auditor General, the Ombudsman, the media, and the scrutiny of
interest groups, apart from judicial review. Judicial lawlessness is now
controlled only by defining it out of existence.
The transfer of power to the courts goes beyond the transfer of
legislative power. It also disturbs in a haphazard way the role of the
executive in deciding the priorities in public spending and the allocation
of time in government agencies and departments. For example, if an
interest group challenges a statute, this _may require an immediate
response with a substantial allocation of departmental resources, and
hence the diversion of those resources from other matters that might be
more crucial.
A pervasive influence will be the allocation of disproportionate
amounts to the resolution of those issues that attract the services of the
legal profession, and a disproportionate amount to the profession itself.
As with every other profession, there is a natural conflict between the
legal profession and the public about how much of the professional
service is optimum. There is a natural propensity for the profession to
generate more refinement in the legal system, and hence to demand that
the proportion of the gross national product allocated to legal services
should exceed the proportion that, given a chance, the public might
determine. The judicial assault on privative clauses and now the Charter
have tended to entrench the judgment of the profession on that question.
The public interest is always threatened when producer interests are
allowed to generate the body of law that determines the demand for the
product.
Perhaps it may be of interest to consider more of what is happening
in response to the Charter. Most of the court decisions declaring a
violation of the Charter have been in criminal proceedings, commonly
drug cases, 50 and the conclusions reached could have been reached just

49 National Citizens' Coalition Inc. et al v Attorney General of Canada, (1984) 32
Alberta LR (2d) 249.
50 For a review of early Charter cases in the area of criminal law, see "Criminal Justice
and the Charter", M L Friedland, (1983) 13 Manitoba Law Journal 549.
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as well under the existing law. For example, many criminal proceedings
have been declared unconstitutional because of unreasonable delay. The
same conclusion could have been reached under Magna Carta. In other
cases, evidence has been declared inadmissable under the Charter for
having been illegally obtained. The same conclusion could have been
reached by traditional case-law development. Many other cases relate to
police practice. This could be regulated more effectively 51 by a Bill of
Rights passed in the form of an ordinary statute and providing a
together with enforcement
statutory code of police behaviour,
mechanisms and sanctions.
inquisitorial proceedings and the powers of
In other moves,
inspectorates are being questioned in the cause of "deregulation". This
may accommodate producer interests, but it is threatening to those who
like to breathe the air, to drink the water, or to eat food without
carcinogenic additives. This threat was enhanced by a dictum in a recent
decision in the Supreme Court of Canada to the effect that the Charter
"... embodies through its reference to a free and democratic society the
essential features of our constitution including the separation of powers,
responsible government and the rule of law". 5 2 If that dictum prevails, it
is now questionable whether a democratically elected legislature has any
power to protect the public interest by establishing a tribunal with a
combination of executive, legislative and adjudicative responsibility.
Perhaps the ultimate irony is that the separation of powers will have
become a part of our constitutional law by the decision of a court in the
exercise of its supreme legislative power.
In other areas, the Charter, like earlier judicial review, has become one
of the forces that hinder or restrain public officials in the pursuit of
public policy objectives. One example relates to the carnage of death and
mutilation that occurs on the highways, much of it as a result of
drunken driving. The police sought to control this problem by
breathalizer testing. The Supreme Court of Canada has now decided that
the demand for a breath sample is a form of detention, and that
therefore a motorist has a constitutional right to counsel and must be
allowed the opportunity of consulting with a lawyer before being
required to blow into the device. In the particular case," the motorist
was required to blow at a police station following an accident and
suspicion of drunkeness, but it is not clear that any different principle
applies when a motorist is required to blow at a roadside spot check.
The reasons for judgment contain no discussion of the availability of
lawyers at the times of day at which these events usually occur, or of
whether a sample taken after consultation with a lawyer will be of any
validity as an indicator of the alcohol content in the body at the time of
driving, or of whether the reduction in the number of drivers who can
be tested in this way with the available police resources will reduce the
level of public safety. It is predictable that ordinary working people will
continue to submit automatically to a police demand for a sample while
some business and professional people, accustomed to the services of
lawyers, may demand their right to counsel. This result will have been
Typically, the Charter decisions relating to the police still leave uncertainty about how
they are expected to behave.
52 Operation Dismantle Inc. et al v the Queen et al, (1985) unreported, per Wilson J at
p 57.
53 The Queen v Therens, (1985) Supreme Court of Canada, unreported.
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achieved by a decision pursuant to a Charter which purports to
guarantee, among other things, that every individual is equal before the
law.
Another case relates to the door-to-door selling rackets, such as those
involving encyclopaedias, saucepans, vacuum cleaners and frozen food.
The public has been subjected to a series of merchandising campaigns
that involve salesmen calling at the home, using high pressure sales
tactics, fraud, and other predatory practices. Nova Scotia, like other
provinces, legislated to constrain these rackets by a licensing system. One
concern was the way in which fly-by-night salesmen would sweep an area
and then be out of the jurisdiction when disputes arose, or when
complaints were made which might have led to criminal proceedings. As
a response to that problem, the relevant regulation required that salesmen
calling at the home must be residents of the province. The court declared
the regulation unconstitutional as violating the right of any citizen to live
and work in any province. 5 4 Here again, there was no impact analysis,
and no discussion in the judgment of the likely impact of the decision,
compared with the regulation, on the control of fraud or other predatory
practices in marketing. Regardless of impact, the right of racketeers to
cross provincial boundaries now has constitutional paramountcy over the
protection of the public against fraud and other predatory practices.
Another judicial move tending to frustrate the achievement of public
policy objectives has been the evolving refusal of the courts to give effect
to statutes creating strict liability offences. This became evident when the
Supreme Court of Canada enacted a distinction between "strict liability"
and "absolute liability". Statutes creating strict liability offences were to
be presumed to allow a defence of reasonable care, and these offences
were to be labelled "strict liability". Only if the legislature made it clear
that no defence of reasonable care was applicable would the court
recognize the offence as one of strict liability, and it would then be
labelled "absolute liability". 5 With the Charter, that distinction is now
going. Some courts have already interpreted the Charter as creating a
prohibition of strict liability (labelled "absolute liability")
constitutional
56
offences.
By making intent or negligence an issue, the courts seem determined to
make proceedings under regulatory legislation judgmental in every case,
and hence to preclude the legislature from creating a deterrent that will
apply automatically in response to structure or conduct. While this may
mitigate harshness, those who are bearing the consequences and paying
the costs of all this have already decided through the elected government
that they prefer more arbitrariness, perhaps with consequential gains in
pollution control, highway safety, and the prevention of predatory
practices in marketing. It has been suggested that the courts might be
willing to allow some exceptions, including pollution control," but this
seems doubtful.5 8 Even if the courts did allow any exceptions, they
54 Basile v Attorney General of Nova Scotia, (1984) 62 NSR (2d) 410. With regard to the
legal profession, however, the court decided that the control of misbehaviour justified
some residence requirements. Black v Law Society of Alberta. 119841 6 WWR 385.
55 The Queen v City of Sault Ste Marie, [19781 2 SCR 1299.
56 Eg R v Westfair Foods Ltd, (1985) 38 Saskatchewan Reports 12; R v Watch, (1983)
24 MVR 224.
57 Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, (1983) 4 CCC (3d) 243, 250.

58 The primary case in which the Supreme Court of Canada undermined strict liability

was a pollution case. Fn 55.
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would still be unlikely to impose significant sanctions without proof of
fault or neglect.
One problem is, of course, that with regard to offences in complex or
multi-location industries, a prosecuting agency may never be able to
rebut a defence of due diligence without replicating the technical and
other knowledge of the industry. Hence the Charter decisions against
strict liability may well be another factor giving immunity to large
corporate enterprises from any effective regulation to constrain predatory
practices, 59 the externalization of cost, or other negative impacts on the
public interest.6 0
It has sometimes been suggested that problems of this type may decline
as the courts gain experience with the Charter and a new generation of
lawyers introduces a more policy-oriented style of advocacy; but that is
unrealistic optimism. The political pressures operating upon the
universities demand a curriculum that is "relevant", and in faculties of
law, the contemporary pressure favours a "core curriculum" which
emphasises private law subjects, with reduced coverage of the subjects
that raise public policy issues affecting the interests of broader sections
of the population.
These negative impacts of the Charter have not been counter- balanced
by major achievements. Much of the statutory revision work following
the Charter has been a process of dotting the i's and crossing the t's.
The number of male pronouns in the statutes has been reduced, but that
was already happening in response to the women's movement.
Of course some decisions under the Charter might be seen as a success
for human rights. For example, a statutory restraint on collective
bargaining was declared unconstitutional. 6' My point, however, is not to
deny that some decisions are made in favour of human rights. It is that
when looking at the total picture, any favourable outcomes are nothing
like enough to justify the damage.
Other cases in which constitutional rights have been protected are not
impressive. For example, as part of the change to metric measures, a
regulation prohibited the advertising of gasoline (petrol) in other than
metric units. This was declared void as a violation of freedom of
expression. 62 There are surely other sufferings of humanity on which the
tax-payers' money could have been spent with greater achievement.
Decisions or challenges of this type, which are an inevitable concomitant
of the Charter, add to the concern that it becomes a diversion from
rather than a protection of fundamental human rights.
In the majority of cases in which Charter issues are raised, the courts
conclude that there has been no violation; but even these cases are not
innocuous. Notice of challenges under the Charter must be given to
Ministries of the Attorneys-General so that often two government
departments or agencies are involved in the case, and sometimes the
governments of other provinces and the federal government are involved.

59 See eg Credit Marketing and Consumer Protection, T G Ison, 1979, Croom Helm,
London, pp 374-6.
60 See eg Decision No 167, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter (B.C.) 234, 251-9.
61 Re Service Employees' International Union and Broadway Manor et al, (1983) 4 DLR
(4th) 231.
62 R v Halpert ei al, (1983) 9 CCC (3d) 411.
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The allocation of tax-payers' money to the process can be substantial,
and with no achievement. At the same time, governments proclaim that
they lack the resources to provide adequate income or services for the
disabled and other needy sections of the population. Moreover, because
of the allocation of departmental resources that may be required to rebut
a challenge under the Charter, officials may sometimes feel constrained
from taking action in pursuit of public policy objectives, particularly
when the threat of Charter litigation comes from a powerful group that
is applying other political pressures.
Constitutional entrenchment can create other problems for policy
the
challenge is predictable,
Where a constitutional
planning.
implementation of a new policy may require affirmation from both the
legislature and the courts, but there is a problem of order. A current
example in Ontario is a government policy to extend public funding to
all years in the Catholic Separate Schools. For the government to go to
the courts first would be difficult because there would be no statute that
has been debated, amended and passed in the legislature on which the
courts could adjudicate. If the government legislates first and implements
the funding, there is an obvious risk of widespread dislocation in respect
of teachers, students and school buildings if the courts should eventually
decide that the legislation is unconstitutional. Even that decision might
still leave doubt about what alternatives would be valid. If the
government legislates first and then goes to the courts before
implementation, there could be years of delay that would be incompatible
with the government's political and legislative time-tables.
The ex-post facto approach in judicial decision-making, coupled with
the pressures which favour judicial discretion over fixed rules, can make
it very difficult for governments and others to engage in long-term policy
planning. Moreover, Charter litigation can involve an enormous diversion
of resources to multiple proceedings. Political battles that have been
fought at substantial expense to the tax-payer in and around the cabinet
and the legislature may have to be fought again, at further expense to
the tax-payer, in and around the courts.
An example can be seen in the administration of medical care. Some
years ago, systems of government medical insurance were introduced
through federal/provincial co-operation. The same insurance coverage was
applied to individuals at all levels of income so that everyone could
receive a good standard of medical care. In recent years, that provision
has been undermined by the medical profession engaging in the "extrabilling" of patients. The predictable result of that practice is the reintroduction of a double standard of medical care. Also, those at lower
levels of income subsidize higher standards of medical care for those at
higher income levels.
To avoid these negative consequences, the Federal Government
legislated against the practice of extra-billing. Predictably, the Canadian
Medical Association has now launched an action claiming that the
legislation is unconstitutional, and the claim includes an allegation that
the statute violates the Charter. It is no surprise to find the responsible
Minister quoted as saying that:
... he is disappointed by the CMA's action because it reopens
issues that were supposedly put to rest with the act's passage and
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could detract from 63efforts to get on with important issues in the
health care system.
This is also another example of the Charter being used not to protect the
weak from the strong. It is again being used by a powerful vested
interest which, having lost in the legislature, now seeks another chance to
defeat the democratic process. Of course the CMA may lose in the
Supreme Court, but that could be in three years time. Meanwhile, the
people will be suffering the health care consequences, vast sums of
money will be spent on the Charter litigation, and the government will
be under greater pressure to compromise with the vested interests, if only
so that it can get on with other matters.
Another consequence of the Charter is the propensity to trivialize the
discussion of public policy issues. Because of the limited capacity of the
courts to engage in any systematic analysis of the social impact of
legislative options, the judicialization of public policy decision-making
leads to results that rest upon an incredibly superficial foundation. It is
probably only the incidence of political power and the pageantry and
mysticism of legal process that enable us to get away with it. Examples
of this trivialization can be seen in the cases mentioned above relating to
election campaign expenditures, itinerant selling, and breathalizer testing.
Another example of the trivialization likely to arise in the near future
relates to mandatory retirement. Various people and interest groups are
launching court challenges under the Charter claiming that mandatory
retirement is a form of age discrimination. Some of those who want to
continue working beyond the present retirement age apparently believe
that the abolition of mandatory retirement would result in people having
a choice. That view, however, ignores any rational analysis of the likely
consequences. A right to continue working beyond the present retirement
age could well reduce the pressure to maintain retirement pensions, so
that in practice, a right to continue working is likely to become a loss of
the right to retire. Another predictable result of any right to continue
working would be an increase in medical examinations and the dismissal
of people whose work output is declining, many of whom would be
below the current retirement age. There are a range of other likely
consequences that would be and have been discussed in debate on the
political scene. It is surely incredible that such a question should be
decided by a court whose traditional modus operandi does not include
that same breadth of debate, that is unrepresentative and consists
64
exclusively of lawyers, that is without the resources for impact analysis,
and that receives only a limited range of inputs. It is even more
questionable when the judges may have personal interests in the outcome.
This trivialization of policy making extends beyond court decisions.
Consideration of the Charter is perceived as a "legal" matter, and thus
one for the Ministries of the Attorneys-General. This tends to increase
the powers of those ministries in relation to the line departments and
agencies of government which would usually have a clearer perception of
public policy objectives. Perhaps for this reason, trivialization has

63 "CMA Challenges Extra-billing Law", Globe and Mail, Toronto, 18 July 1985, p 1.
64 The judges may well recognize impact analysis as relevant. See eg Wilson J in The
Queen v Big M Drug Marl, 1985, Supreme Court of Canada, unreported. But it is
difficult to see how this can be undertaken efficiently in the context of adjudication
on an adversary model.
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characterized the omnibus amending bills that have been introduced to
bring the statutes into accord with the Charter.
The results can be illustrated with regard to sex equality. If one
believes in sex equality, what is important is equality in end result, not
equality on the face of a statute. It is axiomatic that equal justice will
never be achieved by treating everyone alike. When the matter is
perceived as one for the Ministry of the Attorney-General, however, the
predictable result is the pursuit of sex equality on the face of the statutes
regardless of the consequences. Thus the reviews of existing statutes that
have taken place appear to have been done by scrutinizing the language
of the acts, without impact analysis.
An example can be seen in the benefits payable in fatal cases under
the Workers' Compensation Act of British Columbia. They were revised
in 197465 with a primary goal being sex equality. An impact analysis of
the options was undertaken having regard to social and economic
circumstances, and the options considered included sex equality on the
face of the statute. It was then decided that sex equality could best be
advanced by discriminating in the statute in favour of older women.
Now, in response to the Charter, an omnibus bill is going through the
legislature amending various provincial statutes to bring them into accord
6
with what government lawyers apparently believe to be its requirements.6
Predictably, the fatal benefits payable under the Workers' Compensation
Act are now being amended to provide for sex equality on the face of
the statute regardless of how much inequality that produces in result.
The trivialization of debate is aggravated by the problems of
classification generated by the Charter and which can only be resolved in
arbitrary ways. Consider, for example, legislation requiring that shops
and businesses be closed on Sundays. Predictably, this was challenged as
an infringement upon freedom of religion; 67 and yet that can hardly be
discussed as if it were entirely separate from the regulation of labour
relations, competition policy, public health, the promotion of family life,
and perhaps even environmental control. Under the Charter, however,
certain rights are paramount, and if a court finds any way to
accommodate a submission that the infringement of a paramount right is
less harmful than the alternative of damage to other interests, it is
duplicating the legislative function of political judgment.
To raise questions in Canada now of the kind mentioned here would
seem only like a gratuitous lament. Charter litigation is a growth
industry which has already spawned its satellite industries. Together they
engage a preponderance of the "experts" in the subject area and they
constitute powerful interest groups supporting the perpetuation of the
Charter. The repeal of the Charter is virtually impossible, and outside
the ranks of charter enthusiasts, the prevailing mood seems to be one of
cognitive dissonance. The Charter is in place, we must learn to live with
it, and perhaps we should try to like it.

65 Workmen's Compensation Amendment Act, 1974, s 14.
66 Charter of Rights Amendments Bill, 1985, s 121. Section 122 contains other provisions
likely to result in sex inequality, and to the disadvantage of women.
67 In the event, the court decided that the Lord's Day Act, which provided for Sunday
closing, was invalid. The Queen v Big M Drug Mart, 1985, Supreme Court of
Canada, unreported.
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THE NEED FOR EXTENDED USE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS.
The arguments raised above against judicial review are a re-assertion of
the case for democracy and legislative sovereignty. They are arguments
against placing the judiciary at the apex of public policy decision-making;
but they are not arguments against greater use of the judicial process.
Paradoxically, one of the consequences of judicial review has probably
been the under-use of the judicial process in situations where its use
would have been constructive.
First, there are many areas in which the traditional judicial process of
fact finding and applying law to facts could well be expanded. I think in
particular of those adjudicating tribunals and agencies which already have
a pyramid structure, particularly those engaged in the re-distribution of
money, such as the income tax system, and the social insurance and the
social security systems. Primary adjudication in these systems is often
appalling. A decision is made by an adjudicator or other official,
commonly without notice of the issues or any opportunity to be heard,
and without any other form of adequate inquiry. If an aggrieved citizen
wants to appeal, the matter is first referred to a review process within or
closely associated with the initial decision-making unit. A predictable
consequence is a serious downward influence on the quality of primary
adjudication. This structure facilitates the appointment of clerical grade
personnel as initial decision-makers with review officers being selected for
the thinking role. The need, however, is for thinking prior to initial
adjudication, not upon a review. Bearing in mind that the majority of
citizens probably accept even negative decisions of government
departments and agencies without challenge, this type of review structure
tends to promote sloppy decision-making at first instance, which then
becomes tolerated by greasing the squeaky wheels. Moreover, notification
to a claimant of the decision following a review can become,6 in practice,
a form of discouragement from proceeding with an appeal. "
If judicial review applies to these situations, it only applies following a
decision at the top of the pyramid within the system; but injustice is less
likely to be found among those few cases that reach the top of the
pyramid than it is among the vast number in which the people have
acquiesced in negative initial decisions. It is at the primary and first
appeal levels that the judicial process is needed. In many of these
systems, there should be provision for prompt and immediate appeal
from the initial decision to a tribunal operating on a judicial model, and
also spot checking of initial adjudication by that tribunal as a form of
quality control.
As mentioned above, the current structure of judicial review is also
negative in its impact by encouraging the perception of primary
adjudication as "administrative". This tends to excuse those engaged in
this process from proceeding in a judicial manner. What is needed here
is not the adversary system, but an inquisitorial system which, in
addition to enquiries initiated by the adjudicator, includes certain
attributes of the judicial process, such as providing an opportunity to be
heard, keeping an open mind until all the evidence is in, articulation of
the issues, recognition of the applicable criteria, and reasons for
decisions.
68 For further
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Secondly, once a decision has been made in the design of a system
that appellate adjudication should be by a specialized tribunal, it follows
automatically under current thinking that primary adjudication should
not take place in a court of general jurisdiction. That is unfortunate.
There are probably some subject areas in which primary adjudication in
a court of general jursidiction would make sense, and once it is
recognized that appellate adjudication is policy making and that it should
be goal-oriented, it would probably be useful in some situations to have
appeals from courts of general jurisdiction to specialized tribunals. The
incidence of political power, however, including judicial power under the
Charter, precludes that idea from being considered on its merits in any
particular subject context.
Thirdly, an expansion of the judicial method might be provided by
having a tribunal with a general appellate jurisdiction in relation to other
tribunals. Of course I have in mind here the Administrative Appeals
Tribunal established in Australia under the federal system. Unfortunately,
I have not yet had the opportunity to study this. My first impression is
that it should be an improvement over judicial review, but I am still
apprehensive about some of its features, particularly the prospect of
further appeals to the courts and the influence of that in promoting
adherence to the adversary system by the appeal tribunal. As Professor
Whitmore has said, "the procedures need to be tailored away from that
idea of party-party conflict". 69 That is surely less likely to happen when
there is a further appeal to ordinary courts. As long as ordinary courts
are classified or are allowed to classify themselves as "superior" to other
tribunals, the temptation and the pressure are there to perceive of courts
as superior, and for any tribunal members who have aspirations of
"promotion", the temptation may be there to demonstrate their suitability
by showing their capacity to behave in court-like ways.
CONCLUSIONS
We have undertaken a massive expansion in the judicialization of
public policy making. While this will have some successes, it is dangerous
and on the whole counter-productive. It enhances the political power of
those sectors of society that already wielded the greatest power and it is
a drastic curtailment of democratic choice. The damage also includes
delays in the decision-making process and a diversion from more realistic
ways of protecting human rights. In so far as the impact affects the
pursuit of public policy objectives, it tends to be negative, for example,
favouring the interests of polluters over the polluted. To the extent that
judicialization deals with individuals in their relations with government
officials, it seldom produces any system reform. Its more common
successes consist only of greasing a few squeaky wheels.
Of course there are enormous problems with the political processes that
underlie legislation and executive action. The realities fall short of our
more idealistic aspirations. To see a solution in judicial review, however,
increases the problems.
Charter litigation and administration increase the problems of judicial
review in the ways mentioned above, including the diversion and waste
of vast sums of public money. Meanwhile, governments complain of

69 Comment by H Whitmore in (1981)

12 Federal Law Review 117.
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deficit problems which are said to require the curtailment of provisions
for the disabled, the elderly, and other disadvantaged groups.
Judicial review has not been expanded in a discriminating way,
following rational analysis of its impact in each context, with the benefits
and the damage identified, and the former judged to outweigh the latter.
The incidence of political power has militated against the discriminate use
of judicial review, favouring its expansion across the board regardless of
the consequences. Thus judicialization has, particularly through the
Charter, been perceived as a panacea rather than as a medicine which
could have beneficial results if carefully prescribed as a remedy with
known consequences for a diagnosed condition.
With regard to the Charter, it is too late now in Canada to do
anything except lament and try to minimise the damage. For the
communities represented here, however, it may not be too late to utter a
warning cry, and to hope that no-one here may become The Scorcer's
Apprentice.

